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Current trends and policies imply unsustain-
able growth in federal Medicaid outlays. In the
year 2006, federal Medicaid spending was 11.9
percent of federal general revenues and 1.5 per-
cent of GDP. Making conservative assumptions
about future growth in Medicaid enrollment and
spending per beneficiary, this paper estimates
that the present value of federal Medicaid out-
lays over the next 100 years will take up 24 per-
cent of the present value of federal general rev-
enues and 3.7 percent of the present value of
GDP calculated over the same period.  
By the end of the next 100 years, that is, in the
year 2106, Medicaid’s share of federal general
revenues will be 48 percent—four times larger
than its 11.9 percent share in 2006. In the year
2106, federal Medicaid spending as a share of
GDP is estimated to be 7.4 percent—a fivefold
increase from its current share of 1.5 percent. If
the federal government continues to match state
Medicaid outlays at the current rate, Medicaid’s
share of GDP in the year 2106 will become 13
percent—or one-eighth of GDP in 2106.
If current policies and trends are maintained,
federal Medicaid outlays will take up 36 percent
of lifetime federal general revenue taxes for
males born in 2025 and 69 percent for females
born in that year. For females born after 2050,
almost all of their lifetime federal nonpayroll
taxes will be consumed by their lifetime Medic-
aid benefits. 
Higher tax rates cannot plausibly cover this
growing spending commitment. On average,
today’s 35-year-old males are projected to have 15
percent of their lifetime federal general revenues
returned in the form of Medicaid benefits.
Maintaining that ratio for today’s newborn males
would require a 78 percent increase in their life-
time nonpayroll taxes. Limiting Medicaid spend-
ing growth is, thus, an essential component of
putting the federal budget on a sustainable course
without imposing crushing tax burdens on
younger and future generations, thereby harming
the prospects for future economic growth.  
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Introduction
Federal budget watchers usually consider
Social Security and Medicare the main
sources of long-term budgetary concern.1 But
Medicaid, as projected under current policies,
will also impose tremendous additional pres-
sures on federal and state budgets. Allowing
Medicaid spending to grow as in the past
would either significantly crowd out spend-
ing on other government operations or in-
crease pressure for more tax hikes. This paper
mainly focuses on the impact of Medicaid
spending growth on the federal budget.2
Medicaid consists of a collection of state-
operated health care programs for individu-
als with (1) low incomes and assets and/or (2)
high medical expenses. Many groups have
strong incentives to lobby for expanding tax-
financed health care subsidies for low-
income and high-health-risk populations.
Their success is evidenced by the progressive
expansion of Medicaid over the years so that,
today, as much as one-fifth (20.3 percent) of
the U.S. population is dependent on its bene-
fits at some point during the year. 
Both state and federal governments fi-
nance Medicaid’s outlays. Federal Medicaid
outlays have been growing especially rapidly
since the early 1990s. Federal financial partic-
ipation for each state is determined under a
“matching grant” formula. Federal outlays
have increased over time as states have liber-
alized Medicaid eligibility rules and extended
coverage to medically or economically disad-
vantaged groups. 
To project future federal outlays, this paper
first estimates Medicaid enrollment and spend-
ing per beneficiary from various years of the
Current Population Survey. A cohort data set is
constructed beginning with data from the 1988
CPS on Medicaid enrollment and benefits per
recipient, by both age and gender. Those data
provide estimates of age- and gender-specific
growth rates of Medicaid enrollment and bene-
fits per enrollee. The two growth rates are used
together with the Social Security Administra-
tion’s population projections by age and gender
and the Congressional Budget Office’s estimate
of Medicaid’s expenditure-to-GDP ratio in
2075 to calibrate projections of total Medicaid
expenditures beyond 2075. The projection
methodology yields Medicaid benefits per capi-
ta by age and gender that can be used to project
(1) the extent of budget pressure that Medicaid
will generate for the federal budget and (2) how
large Medicaid benefits would become relative
to projected federal general revenues on a
cohort-by-cohort basis. 
To preview the results, today’s newborn
males would receive about 28 percent, and
females about 54 percent, of their lifetime
federal nonpayroll taxes back by way of feder-
al Medicaid benefits, per capita. If those poli-
cies and trends continue for a few more
decades, federal Medicaid outlays will take
up 36 percent of lifetime federal general rev-
enue taxes for males born in 2025 and 69 per-
cent for females born in that year. For
females born after 2050, Medicaid outlays as
a share of federal general revenues will be
close to 100 percent. 
Returning such a high share of each gen-
eration’s general tax revenues by way of
Medicaid benefits—a result of Medicaid’s
rapid outlay growth—is inconsistent with
maintaining growth in other federal services
at the same pace as GDP and maintaining
taxes at current rates. However, increasing
income and other nonpayroll taxes by
enough to reduce Medicaid’s expenditure
share of nonpayroll revenues would impose
implausibly large fiscal burdens on future
generations.
For example, today’s 35-year-olds are pro-
jected to receive 15 percent of their general rev-
enue taxes back in the form of lifetime
Medicaid benefits, on average. Ensuring that
the same result holds for today’s newborns
would require a 78 percent increase in their
lifetime nonpayroll taxes. A similar calculation
for newborn females shows that their lifetime
nonpayroll taxes would have to be increased
by 62 percent. Those projections and calcula-
tions indicate that limiting Medicaid spend-
ing growth is necessary to place the federal
budget on a sustainable course.  
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The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 enacted
reductions in the growth of future Medicaid
outlays of less than $5 billion between fiscal
years 2006 and 2010.3 Congress further enact-
ed a $10 billion reduction in Medicaid outlay
growth in 2006, though not without consider-
able resistance from the program’s supporters.
However, compared to the reductions in
future outlay growth required to keep the fed-
eral budget on a sustainable path, those
Medicaid cuts are small potatoes. They would
hardly dent future spending pressures ema-
nating from growing enrollments and rapidly
rising health care costs. The stark arithmetic
of the generational results reported in this
paper would remain largely unchanged. 
Projecting Medicaid’s
Future Cost
Many groups have strong incentives to
lobby for expanding Medicaid, including
health care providers, estate planners advising
clients about how to qualify for Medicaid’s
valuable long-term care and nursing home
benefits, and employers and insurers wishing
to improve the health risk characteristics of
private insurance purchasers. State govern-
ments also typically seek to maximize federal
Medicaid matching contributions. 
Figure 1 shows the historical growth of
both state and total Medicaid outlays as shares
of total federal and state spending. The figure
clearly shows that most of the post-1990 surge
in the share of total Medicaid spending in total
government (federal and state) spending is
from exploding federal Medicaid outlays.
Changes in federal financial participation
rules—Disproportionate Share Hospital reim-
bursements without caps—allowed states to
claim additional Medicaid reimbursements
from the federal government.4 States’ incen-
tives to increase access to federal funds
through that mechanism were strengthened
because of the severe budget crunch and steep
increases in Medicaid enrollments caused by
the 1991 recession. According to the historical
3
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account by John D. Klemm of the Office of the
Actuary at the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, Medicaid enrollment grew
by 12.2 percent during 1991–92 alone.5
Another reason for high Medicaid spending
growth was steep increases in per beneficiary
outlays during and after the 1991 recession.
According to Klemm, Medicaid spending
growth per enrollee was 9.7 percent during
1991–92, after adjusting for inflation. Al-
though growth in Medicaid spending per ben-
eficiary was relatively low during the mid-
1990s, continued increases in enrollment kept
growth in overall Medicaid spending higher
than that in overall government spending. As
Figure 1 shows, Medicaid spending continued
to grow as a share of total government spend-
ing throughout the 1990s.
Figure 2 shows that federal Medicaid out-
lays ratcheted upward during the 1991 and
2001 economic recessions but did not recede
to prerecession levels after the recessions
ended.6 That implies that federal policies to
liberalize Medicaid eligibility and benefits
that were enacted during the last two reces-
sions became permanently entrenched in the
corpus of Medicaid rules. This paper takes
the underlying trend in Medicaid’s enroll-
ment and benefit growth by age and gender
as a fundamental building block for project-
ing future Medicaid outlays. 
Medicaid’s spending projections are con-
structed on the basis of two age- and gender-
specific profiles—Medicaid spending per
enrollee and Medicaid enrollment as a share of
the population. In addition, the average growth
by age and gender of Medicaid enrollments
and spending per beneficiary are calculated
from the CPS’s March supplements released
between 1988 and 2005.7 That span of years
includes two economic recessions. Hence, the
average growth rates of spending per benefi-
ciary and Medicaid enrollment as a share of
the population calculated across that time
span should adequately capture effects across
years of economic recessions and booms. 
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Even if the share of beneficiaries in the
population were constant in the future,
Medicaid spending would increase as a share
of GDP over time: Figure 3 shows that the
annual nominal growth rates of Medicaid
spending per beneficiary exceed annual
growth in GDP per capita (4.2 percent) for
most age and gender categories. Factoring in
growth in the share of the population
enrolled in Medicaid (see Figure 4) would
make the growth in total Medicaid outlays
even more rapid. 
The projections of federal Medicaid spend-
ing made in this paper should be viewed as
conservative. For Medicaid to be at all sustain-
able, growth in its aggregate outlays must
eventually be slowed to a rate equal to or less
than GDP growth. In making long-term pro-
jections, therefore, the age-gender growth
rates of spending per recipient and the age-
gender growth rates of the shares of the popu-
lation enrolled in Medicaid must both be
reduced. The projections constructed here
assume that growth of future Medicaid enroll-
ments and of benefits per enrollee would be
gradually decreased—even though federal and
state governments have shown little inclina-
tion to do so. Damping factors are applied to
the two growth rate profiles by age and gender
so that annual federal Medicaid spending
growth eventually equals annual GDP growth.
Thus, the federal Medicaid spending projec-
tions reported here are conservative—smaller
than they would be if growth in enrollment
and spending per beneficiary continued at
their historical rates.
If future Medicaid income and asset eligi-
bility limits were indexed to inflation but indi-
viduals and households experienced real
income growth, the fraction of the population
eligible for Medicaid benefits would decline
over time. However, federal and state policy-
makers may make Medicaid’s eligibility tests
less restrictive and cause the Medicaid-eligible
population share to stay constant or even
increase in the future—as has occurred in the
past. The outlay projections developed here
conservatively assume that the growth in the
population of Medicaid eligibles would decline
at a constant rate of 11.3 percent per year and
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Figure 3
Average (geometric) Growth of Medicaid Benefits per Recipient per Year by Age and
Gender: 1987–2004
gradually approach zero. That growth-damp-
ing rate is calibrated to ensure that the total
beneficiary population does not exceed 25 per-
cent of the total population—slightly larger
than the current aggregate share of recipients
of 20.3 percent. Sensitivity tests are conducted
to show how the terminal-year (2106) popula-
tion share of beneficiaries would change under
different growth-damping assumptions. 
The application of a similar damping factor
to growth in the level of spending per benefici-
ary is more problematic because of uncertain-
ties about future health care price inflation,
medical service utilization, and the impact of
technological advances on those factors. In the
projections reported below, it is assumed that
growth in spending per recipient will gradually
approach the growth rate of GDP. Again, this is
a conservative assumption relative to historical
experience in which Medicaid outlays have dou-
bled as a share of GDP since the early 1980s. It
implies that annual Medicaid outlays will even-
tually consume a constant fraction of GDP—as
the population-age structure stabilizes and the
two growth factors closely approximate their re-
spective asymptotic values. The damping of the
growth of spending per beneficiary is calibrated
to yield a federal Medicaid outlay share of GDP
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Table 1
Perspectives on Current Federal Medicaid Outlays and Enrollment
Federal Medicaid Outlays Federal Medicaid Outlays Medicaid Enrollees as
as a Share of Federal General as a Share of GDP, a Share of Total
Revenue, 2006 (percent) 2006 (percent) Population, 2006 (percent)
11.9 1.5 20.3
Source: Author’s calculations.
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Current Population Survey.
Figure 4
Average (geometric) Medicaid Enrollment Growth per Year by Age and Gender:
1987–2004
in 2075 equal to that projected by the CBO (5.3
percent).8 Medicaid’s spending commitment is
evaluated under projections through the next
100 years. The generational calculations of
Medicaid’s fiscal incidence are based on projec-
tions extended further beyond 2106.9 See
Appendix for details of calculations.
Results
Table 1 shows current Medicaid expendi-
tures as a share of both GDP and federal gen-
eral revenues and current Medicaid enrollment
as a share of population. Row 1 of Table 2
shows Medicaid’s projected cost under base-
case assumptions in various ways: as a share of
GDP in 2106 (column 2) and federal general
revenues in 2106 (column 3); in present value
terms (column 4) through 2106; and as ratios
to the present values of GDP and federal gen-
eral revenues through the year 2106 (columns
5 and 6). Column 7 shows the maximum share
of Medicaid recipients in the total population
through the projection horizon of 2106. 
Under the projections described earlier,
Medicaid would consume an implausibly
large share of GDP over the next 100 years.
The present value of federal Medicaid outlays
projected through 2106 equals $21.1 trillion,
or 3.7 percent of the present value of GDP over
that period.10 By 2106 annual federal Medi-
caid outlays are estimated to reach 7.4 percent
of annual GDP. If the federal government were
to continue to match state Medicaid outlays at
the current rate, total Medicaid spending
would consume roughly one-eighth of GDP
(13.0 percent) by 2106. 
Medicaid likewise would consume an
implausibly large share of federal general rev-
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Table 2
Sensitivity of Federal Medicaid Outlays to Alternative Assumptions about Growth-Damping Factors
Present Present Present Value
Value of Value of of Federal
Federal Federal Federal Medicaid
Growth- Medicaid Medicaid Medicaid Outlays as a
Damping Federal Federal Outlays Outlays Outlays as Share of the Maximum
Growth- Factor on Medicaid Medicaid as a Share through a Share of Present Value Share of
Damping Medicaid Outlays Outlays of Federal 2106 the Present of Federal Population
Factor on Enrollment as a Share as a Share General (trillions Value General Enrolled in ,
Benefits per as a Share of of GDP of GDP Revenues of constant of GDP, Revenues, Medicaid
Recipient Population in 2075 in 2106 in 2106 2006 through through through
Experiment # (cB)† (cR)† (%) (%) (%) dollars) 2106 (%) 2106 (%) 2106 (%)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 (base case) 0.8* 11.3** 5.3*** 7.4 47.9 21.1 3.7 23.6 25.0
2 0.8 14.3 5.1 7.2 46.4 20.4 3.6 22.8 23.8
3 0.8 8.3 5.6 7.8 50.6 22.3 3.9 24.9 27.5
4 1.0 11.3 5.0 6.7 43.3 20.4 3.6 22.8 25.0
5 0.6 11.3 5.6 8.3 53.9 21.9 3.9 24.5 25.0
6 0.8 100.0 4.6 6.5 42.3 18.2 3.2 20.3 20.3
7 100.0 11.3 2.6 2.7 17.6 13.5 2.4 15.1 25.0
8 100.0 100.0 2.2 2.3 14.6 11.3 2.0 12.6 20.3
Source: Author’s calculations.
† A value of x percent means the corresponding growth rate is reduced by x percent each year.
* Calibrated to yield CBO’s estimate of Medicaid outlays as a share of GDP in 2075 (i.e., 5.3 percent).
** Calibrated to ensure that Medicaid beneficiaries remain less than 25 percent of the population by 2106.
*** CBO benchmark value.
enues. In 2006 federal spending on Medicaid
amounted to $180.9 billion.11 Federal general
revenues—that is, total receipts less social
insurance taxes—equaled $1,517.0 billion in
that year,12 making federal Medicaid spending
equal to 11.9 percent of federal general rev-
enues. If program outlays followed the base-
case projections described above, Medicaid
would soak up almost a quarter of federal rev-
enues through 2106 (row 1 column 6) in pres-
ent value terms. By 2106 annual federal
Medicaid outlays would equal 47.9 percent of
annual federal general revenues (row 1, col-
umn 3).13 That implies a fourfold increase in
federal Medicaid outlays as a share of federal
general revenues. An increase of that magni-
tude would either require a corresponding
reduction in other government outlays
financed out of general revenues if increasing
federal taxes proved infeasible or, as is likely, be
counterproductive because of its negative
impact on overall economic growth. 
Table 2 also shows how sensitive these esti-
mates are to alternative rates of damping the
growth of beneficiaries’ share in the popula-
tion and spending per recipient. Curbing
enrollment growth at a slightly faster pace
than under the base case yields only modest
savings. Row 2 of the table shows that reduc-
ing the growth of the population share of
Medicaid enrollees at a constant rate of 14.3
percent per year rather than 11.3 percent per
year reduces Medicaid enrollees as a share of
the population in 2106 from 25 percent to
23.8 percent. That change reduces the present
value of Medicaid outlays over the next 100
years by only $700 billion, from $21.1 trillion
to $20.4 trillion, and makes the present value
of federal Medicaid spending equal to 3.6 per-
cent of the present value of GDP, as opposed
to 3.7 percent under the base case (compare
values in rows 1 and 2 for column 5). As a
share of the present value of general revenues
(column 6), the present value of federal
Medicaid spending equals 22.8 percent—only
slightly smaller than the 23.6 percent under
the base case of row 1. 
Curbing per beneficiary spending growth
at a slightly faster rate has only a modest effect
on Medicaid outlays. Row 4 of Table 2 shows
that the present value of savings on federal
Medicaid outlays would again amount to just
$700 billion (relative to the base case) if
growth in spending per recipient were damped
at 1.0 percent per year instead of 0.8 percent
per year under the base case.
Row 8 of Table 2 shows the impact of
immediately curbing growth in both Medicaid
enrollments and benefits per enrollee for all
age and gender groups. Despite the dramatic
reduction in projected Medicaid spending
growth, Medicaid spending over the next 100
years remains as high as $11.3 trillion. And fed-
eral Medicaid outlays as a share of federal gen-
eral revenues (column 3) increase to 14.6 per-
cent by 2106, higher than Medicaid’s 2006
share of 11.9 percent of federal general rev-
enues. This growth in Medicaid’s share of fed-
eral general revenues occurs because freezing
both enrollment shares and benefits would not
eliminate the impact of population aging on
Medicaid spending. In future years, the frac-
tion of the population in age groups incurring
higher Medicaid costs would increase gradual-
ly (see Figure 5). In addition, as the baby
boomers who are currently in their 40s and 50s
become older, they will move into age groups
with higher Medicaid enrollment rates (see
Figure 6). In present value terms, however,
freezing both enrollments and benefits per
recipient at current levels makes the present
value ratio of federal Medicaid spending to fed-
eral revenues only slightly higher (12.6 percent)
than its 2006 ratio (11.9 percent). 
How large a contributor to higher federal
costs is growth in Medicaid benefits per
enrollee? Row 6 of Table 2, which shows the
impact of freezing only enrollment shares by
age and gender, provides the answer. Under
this scenario, the present value of federal
Medicaid outlays increases by $6.9 trillion—
to $18.2 trillion from the $11.3 trillion esti-
mate when both growth factors are immedi-
ately reduced to zero (row 8). In this case, the
present value of federal Medicaid spending
would be 20.3 percent of the present value of
federal general revenues. Alternatively, rising
enrollment shares alone (row 7) contribute
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Figure 5
Average Medicaid Benefits per Beneficiary by Age and Gender
Figure 6
Average Medicaid Enrollment Shares in the Population by Age and Gender
only an additional $2.2 trillion to the present
value of Medicaid costs (column 4) com-
pared to the scenario where growth in both
enrollment and per beneficiary spending is
immediately reduced to zero. These results
suggest that consistently holding down
Medicaid spending per enrollee is likely to be
critically important for controlling both fed-
eral and overall Medicaid spending.
Medicaid’s Future Bite:
A Generational Perspective
Congress funds the federal portion of
Medicaid entirely out of general revenues.
Unlike Social Security and Medicare Part A,
Medicaid lacks a dedicated revenue source and
does not have even a notional trust fund. As a
result, it is not possible to estimate an “unfund-
ed obligation” for Medicaid. However, it is pos-
sible to calculate the present value of the pro-
gram’s projected spending over a certain time
horizon to obtain an idea about how large the
federal government’s “spending commitment”
under Medicaid is. 
As was noted in an earlier section, even if
Medicaid enrollments and benefits per enrollee
were frozen at current levels (in real terms), the
federal “commitment” to fund Medicaid over
the next 100 years would involve outlays of
$11.3 trillion in present value. That could be
considered an absolute lower bound to the fed-
eral Medicaid spending commitment. How-
ever, under base-case assumptions, wherein the
growth of enrollments and benefits per recipi-
ent are dampened gradually, that spending
commitment could amount to almost $21 tril-
lion in present value over the next 100 years.
This section analyzes Medicaid’s spending
commitment along generational lines using
base-case projections. It calculates the com-
mitment on account of cohorts distinguished
by birth year and gender on a prospective
basis—the present value of Medicaid benefits
received per capita over the remaining lifetime
10
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of each cohort. The cohorts included in the
analysis are all those alive in 2006 (males and
females aged 0 through 100) and those that
would be born through the year 2050. 
Like most transfers, federal general rev-
enues can also be allocated to different cohorts
by age and gender. Since Medicaid benefits are
financed out of general revenues, a comparison
of prospective lifetime general revenue tax pay-
ments with prospective lifetime Medicaid ben-
efits for each cohort reveals each cohort’s net
(projected) contribution to funding federal
non-Medicaid public services and other entitle-
ment expenditures. 
Figures 7 and 8 show the lifetime (present
value) profiles of non-social-insurance taxes
and Medicaid benefits mentioned above for
male and female cohorts. They show that
those born prior to 1941 (aged 65 or older
today) would contribute relatively little to fed-
eral general revenues prospectively. Not sur-
prisingly, the figures show that for today’s
retirees, future lifetime Medicaid benefits
alone would roughly equal or exceed their
future general revenue taxes. For example,
females born in 1931 (aged 75 in 2006) would
contribute $25,400 to federal general revenues
in present value during their remaining life-
times but they would receive $27,600 in pres-
ent value federal Medicaid benefits per capita.
Males born in 1931 would receive about
$21,800 in present value federal Medicaid ben-
efits but would contribute about $29,300 in
present value to federal general revenues.
Those born between the mid-1960s and
the mid-1990s (aged between 15 and 45 today,
or the post–baby boom generations) would
bear the largest prospective general revenue
tax burdens in present value. That is because
those generations are currently in or are
approaching their highest earning and tax-
paying years. For example, in present value
terms, males born in 1975 (aged 31 in 2006)
would pay $369,300 per capita, and females
born in the same year would pay $197,100 per
capita, in non-social-insurance taxes. The pres-
ent values of their lifetime Medicaid benefits,
however, are estimated at only $57,500 (males)
and $65,700 (females).
For today’s 31-year-old males, remaining
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Source: Author’s calculations.
lifetime Medicaid benefits equal 15.6 percent
of remaining lifetime federal non-social-
insurance tax payments. For today’s 31-year-
old females, that ratio equals 33.3 percent.
The much higher ratio for females relative to
males arises because females receive larger
prospective federal Medicaid benefits and
receive them for longer periods because of
their longer life expectancy. Moreover,
females’ lower prospective labor force partic-
ipation, earnings, and federal general revenue
tax payments imply smaller present values of
lifetime general tax payments.
Figures 7 and 8 show that the present val-
ues of prospective federal general revenue
taxes and prospective federal Medicaid bene-
fits are much smaller for today’s children and
taxpayers to be born in the future than are
those of today’s young adults and middle-
aged generations. The present value of federal
general revenue taxes per capita declines for
later-born generations. For example,  today’s
children will not begin to earn and pay taxes
for another decade or longer. However, the
present value of lifetime federal Medicaid ben-
efits declines for each successive birth cohort
at a much slower rate than does the present
value of lifetime federal non-social-insurance
taxes. That’s because children receive sizable
federal Medicaid benefits per capita, mainly
because of their high Medicaid enrollment
rates. Thus, future generations will receive
substantial benefits soon after they are born. 
The slower decline in the present value of
federal Medicaid benefits relative to the
decline in federal non-social-insurance taxes
at progressively younger ages implies that
federal Medicaid benefits would loom much
larger as a share of general revenue tax pay-
ments for younger and future generations.
For example, in present value terms, females
born in 2006 would pay $133,500 in federal
general revenue taxes per capita and would
receive $71,900 in federal Medicaid benefits
per capita—making lifetime Medicaid bene-
fits account for 53.9 percent of their lifetime
federal general revenue contributions. 
As Figures 7 and 8 show, base-case projec-
tions of Medicaid costs imply that the present
value of federal Medicaid benefits as a share of
the present value of nonpayroll tax payments
escalates for females born still later. For those
born soon after 2050, lifetime Medicaid bene-
fits would consume almost 100 percent of their
federal nonpayroll taxes!14 Stated differently,
unless Medicaid’s outlay growth is constrained
substantially or additional revenues are gener-
ated without constraining overall economic
growth (which appears to be impossible), the
general revenue payments by successive gener-
ations will be increasingly devoted to Medicaid
outlays, with little left over for financing other
government operations, including federal
courts, national defense, infrastructure con-
struction, scientific research, education, and so
on. These results make it clear that the base-
case projections of Medicaid enrollment and
benefit growth (which are conservative relative
to historical experience) are far from sustain-
able.
Conclusion
Medicaid is a safety net program whose
financial design provides incentives to private
individuals, medical care providers, and state
governments to drive outlays continually
upward—as evidenced by sustained increases
in enrollments, costs per enrollee, and the ris-
ing share of national output consumed by the
program. 
Federal Medicaid expenditures have grown
much faster than inflation. Growth in the
share of the population that is enrolled in
Medicaid and growth in Medicaid spending
per enrollee have together caused a sustained
increase in Medicaid outlays as a share of GDP
during the last several decades.
Federal (and state) Medicaid outlays usual-
ly surge during recessions when income losses
increase Medicaid enrollment. Medicaid’s cur-
rent share of federal non-social-insurance rev-
enues equals 11.9 percent, up from 4.9 percent
in 1985. As a share of GDP, Medicaid outlays
did not recede to their prerecession level in the
aftermaths of the last two recessions (1991
and 2001).15 That’s because increases in
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Females born in
2006 would pay
$133,500 in feder-
al general revenue
taxes per capita
and would receive
$71,900 in federal
Medicaid benefits
per capita—
making lifetime
Medicaid benefits
account for 53.9
percent of their
lifetime federal
general revenue
contributions.
Medicaid enrollments and benefits per
enrollee did not revert sufficiently after the
recessions ended. Medicaid outlays have ratch-
eted upward as a share of GDP—rising from
0.5 percent in 1985 to 1.5 percent today. 
Current Medicaid policies and recent
trends imply unsustainable future growth of
Medicaid outlays. When federal Medicaid
outlays are projected under conservative
assumptions, the present value of the federal
government’s spending commitment over
the next 100 years equals at least $11 trillion
and could be as high as $21 trillion. Under
those projections, an increasing share of fed-
eral general revenues would be consumed by
federal Medicaid outlays. Medicaid’s current
11.9 percent share of federal general revenues
would quadruple to one-half of federal gen-
eral revenues in another 100 years. Such a
rapid increase in Medicaid’s share of the fed-
eral budget would force cutbacks in other
federal spending or require substantial tax
hikes to finance them. But using tax increas-
es as a solution to future budget shortfalls is
unlikely to work as they would impair future
generations’ incentives to work and shift eco-
nomic activity to informal, nontaxed sectors. 
Viewed through the lens of generational
analysis—with Medicaid costs and non-social-
insurance taxes calculated as present values on
a cohort-by-cohort basis—projected federal
Medicaid outlays would return an implausibly
large part of younger and future generations’
general revenue payments to them—again indi-
cating severe pressure on the federal budget to
find resources for funding other operations. 
Applying the brakes on Medicaid’s outlay
growth should be an urgent priority for policy-
makers. Unless efforts to scale back Medicaid
costs and federal outlays become more vigor-
ous than those recently enacted, and unless
those new efforts are sustained, Medicaid will
compound the budget crunch already brewing
on account of other entitlement programs. In
that case, the federal budget and the entire U.S.
economy would be primed for a nasty crash.
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Appendix: 
Projecting Federal Medicaid Outlays
Medicaid’s spending projections are constructed on the basis of two age- and gender-specif-
ic growth rates: (1) Medicaid spending per enrollee and (2) Medicaid enrollment as a share of the
population. Both growth rates are calculated from the CPS’s March supplements released
between 1988 and 2005.16 This span of years includes two economic recessions. Hence, the aver-
age growth rates of spending per beneficiary and Medicaid enrollment as a share of population
adequately capture effects across years of economic recessions and booms.
To facilitate comparison of the federal government’s Medicaid spending commitment, total
federal general revenues and GDP are also projected. In the case of federal revenues, age-gender
profiles of nonpayroll tax payments are derived from microdata sources on the incidence of
income, property, sales, excise, and other taxes.17 GDP per capita is projected by first estimating
GDP per person in 2006—by allocating 2006 GDP ($13.2 trillion) uniformly across the 2006
population—and applying the base case’s labor productivity growth rate of 2.1 percent per year
to derive future GDP per capita. The age-gender profiles of general revenues and GDP per capi-
ta are each combined with population projections provided by the Social Security
Administration to estimate aggregate general revenues and aggregate GDP for future years. 
To avoid inconsistencies with official projections of Medicaid spending, the outlays pro-
jected here are calibrated to match the Congressional Budget Office’s 2075 estimate of
Medicaid’s spending share of GDP. To that end, GDP is also projected assuming long-term
nominal growth of per capita GDP of 4.2 percent per year. That growth rate is consistent with
annual growth in productivity of about 2.0 percent and consumer price inflation of about 2.2
percent—both of which are adopted by the CBO in its latest long-term economic assump-
tions.18 Population projections of the Social Security Administration—extended beyond their
terminal year (2080) using final year fertility, mortality, and immigration assumptions—are
used to project total GDP beyond 2080. 
Using a 4 percent real discount rate (which implies a 6.2 percent nominal discount rate),
the estimated present value of GDP through 2106 equals $566 trillion. Using a similar
methodology, the present value of non-social-insurance taxes (including taxes on personal
and corporate income and excise, customs, and other taxes) is estimated to be $89.0 trillion
through the year 2106. 
The latest data on Medicaid enrollment and benefits available from the CPS pertain to the
year 2004 (from the CPS March survey released in 2005).19 Figures 3 and 4 show the average
annual (geometric) growth rates of Medicaid enrollments and benefits per recipient by age
and gender, calculated between 1987 and 2004 (from CPS March surveys released between
1988 and 2005). These growth rates are based on the real value of benefits—that is, after deflat-
ing each survey year’s benefits by that year’s consumer price index (normalized to set the CPI
for 2006 = 1.0). 
The average growth rates (by age and gender) of benefits per recipient (shown in Figure 3)
are first used to increase average benefits per recipient over two years to generate estimated
age-gender profiles of average Medicaid benefits for 2006 (shown in Figure 5). In essence, for
each age and gender category, the average 2004 benefit per recipient is multiplied by the
square of one plus the growth rate of benefits per recipient for the same age-gender category—
that is, ba,s,2006 = ba,s,2004 x (1 + ga,s)
2, where ba,s,2006 represents benefits per recipient of age a
and gender s in 2006 and ga,s represents the annual growth of benefits per recipient of age a
and gender s. A similar operation on average enrollment by age and gender in 2004 (shown in
Figure 6) using average age-gender enrollment growth rates (shown in Figure 4) yields average
age-gender enrollment profiles for 2006. 
Survey reports of Medicaid enrollment and benefits are known to contain underreporting
biases. Survey respondents may be unwilling to report being covered under Medicaid for sev-
eral reasons. Underreporting of coverage may occur because of the stigma associated with wel-
fare receipt, because of a lack of awareness of coverage, or because respondents are covered
under multiple health insurance plans and tend to forget about their coverage under
Medicaid. Benefit levels may be underreported if respondents do not recall benefits claimed
early during the previous year. 
To correct for underreporting of enrollment and benefits, the 2006 age-gender profiles of
average enrollments and benefits per recipient, as derived above, are benchmarked to nation-
al aggregates. First, the fraction of the total population enrolled in Medicaid in 2006 is esti-
mated using CPS data. It is the sum over all age and gender categories of the product of enroll-
ment shares in 2006 (calculated above) and the U.S. resident population in 2006 as provided
by the Social Security Administration. That share (12.9 percent) turns out to be much small-
er than the ratio of the official CBO estimate of total Medicaid enrollees to the 2006 popula-
tion (20.3 percent).20 Hence, each age-gender enrollment share, ra,s,2006, is multiplied by the
ratio 20.3/12.9 = 1.58 to obtain age-gender enrollment share profiles benchmarked to CBO’s
official estimate of the nationwide Medicaid enrollment rate.21
Second, the 2006 age-gender profiles of average benefits per recipient are used to calculate
weighted aggregate Medicaid outlays for 2006, CPS_M2006, as the sum across all age and gen-
der categories of the product of three age- and gender-specific items:
1. the age- and gender-specific population, pa,s,2006,
2. the fraction receiving Medicaid benefits, ra,s,2006 as calculated earlier, and 
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3. benefits per recipient, ba,s,2006. 
That is,
100
CPS_M2006 = n n pa,s,2006 ra,s,2006 ba,s,2006 (1)
a=0 s=m, f
The value of CPS_M2006 so calculated equals $267.7 billion. Although this value refers to total
individually reported (federal plus state) benefits, it is unlikely to equal actual officially report-
ed state plus federal Medicaid outlays. That’s because the above correction for underreporting
refers to enrollments, not to benefits received by enrollees. All that’s required here, however, is
to calibrate the average benefit profiles by age and gender to reflect just federal Medicaid
spending. Hence, each value of the average benefit profile by age and gender, ba,s,2006, is
rescaled by the ratio of the officially reported federal Medicaid outlay for 2006 to CPS_M2006.
Total federal Medicaid outlays for 2006 reported by the Congressional Budget Office equal
$189.5 billion, making the benchmarking ratio equal to 0.709.22 In other words, the average
enrollee’s reported benefits will be changed to correct for underreporting and to rescale ben-
efit profiles by age and gender to be consistent with just federal spending on Medicaid. 
Next, federal Medicaid outlays are projected for years beyond 2006. To obtain total
Medicaid outlays for 2007, for example, 2006’s benefits per recipient and enrollment shares
by age and gender are first multiplied by annual growth rates of spending per recipient and
enrollment shares by age and gender, respectively. Next, total enrollments for 2007 are
obtained by multiplying the resulting enrollment shares by age and gender by the 2007 pop-
ulation counts by age and gender.23 Finally, total enrollments by age and gender are multi-
plied by spending per recipient (by age and gender) for 2007 (obtained from the prior calcu-
lation). Spending for each age and gender is summed to yield a projection of total federal
Medicaid outlays for 2007. Projections for future periods proceed in a similar manner. 
Thus, projecting Medicaid outlays, Mt, for a future year t > 2006 under the calibration
described earlier involves the following computation: 
100
Mt = n n pa,s,t (ra,s,t–1 UR,t) (ba,s,t–1 UB,t) (2)
a=0 s=m, f
where
UR,t = [1 + (1 – δR)
t–2006
Ra,s]
and 
UB,t = [1 + G
_
+ (1 – δB)
t–2006
(Ba,s – 
_
G)] for s = m, f.
Here, Ba,s represents growth in Medicaid benefits per recipient by age and gender as shown in
Figure 3, and Ra,s represents growth in the share of Medicaid enrollees in the population by age
and gender as shown in Figure 4. Note that the constant damping rates applied to enrollment-
share growth and to growth in benefits per beneficiary—δR and δB, respectively—are both set
to exceed zero. As a result, the gross damping factor on enrollment shares, UR,t, asymptotes
to unity and the gross damping factor on benefits per beneficiary, UB,t, asymptotes to the
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annual (gross) growth rate of GDP, (1 + 
_
G), where 
_
Gis the annual net growth rate of GDP. This
calibration of enrollment and benefit growth rates together with the estimation procedure for
aggregate federal Medicaid spending described earlier yields a projection of nominal Medicaid
spending that can be extended as far into the future as required. Here, present values of spend-
ing are calculated through 2106. The generational calculations reported below use projections
of per capita Medicaid benefits beyond 2106. 
The time series of projected total federal Medicaid outlays derived through this procedure
is discounted using a nominal interest rate of 6.2 percent per year. That implies a real discount
rate of about 4 percent per year, given the earlier assumption on long-term inflation (2.2 per-
cent per year). This real discount rate is about 50 basis points larger than the government’s
real long-term interest rate (roughly 3.5 percent). That 50 basis point premium on the dis-
count rate could be interpreted as accounting for the uncertainty associated with continuing
current Medicaid policy. Applying a higher discount rate to find present values implies small-
er dollar estimates. However, note that the higher (premium inclusive) discount rate is applied
to all future dollar flows: Medicaid benefits, future general revenues, and GDP. Hence, results
expressed in terms of ratios (for example, the present value of Medicaid spending as a share of
the present value of GDP) would not be changed because of a higher discount rate. However,
the dollar estimates of the present value of federal Medicaid outlays reported here may be said
to err on the conservative side, as they are smaller than if no risk premium were included in
the long-term government interest rate. 
It would obviously be desirable to translate the two growth-dampening factors used in con-
structing the projections into actual policy instruments. Doing so in the case of Medicaid is
difficult, however, because each state’s Medicaid program has unique features and policy con-
trols. The only uniform policy lever that could be adjusted is the federal matching rate for-
mula (FMAP). Congress could adjust FMAP rates to yield the same reductions in federal out-
lay growth as under the alternatives reported here. However, state governments would decide
whether that reduced growth would come primarily from slower enrollment growth or slow-
er growth in benefits per enrollee.24 Alternatively, Congress could abandon open-ended
matching grants and cap the federal contribution to each state’s Medicaid program.25
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1.  The recently released annual reports of the
Social Security and Medicare trustees suggest that
under current policies, those two programs’
cumulative deficits amount to $89.5 trillion in
present value. See 2007 Annual Report of the Board of
Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance
and Disability Insurance Trust Funds, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/index.html; and
the 2007 Annual Report of the Boards of Trustees of the
Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal Supplementary
Insurance Trust Funds, available at http://www.cms.
hhs.gov/reportstrustfunds/. 
2.  The implications for state budgets can be in-
ferred by assuming that the current federal match-
ing rate formulas remain applicable in future years.
3.  See the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Library of
Congress, Bill number S. 1932, available at http:
//frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?d
bname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:s1932enr.txt.pdf.
See also the concurrent Resolution on the Budget
for Fiscal Year 2006, House of Representatives, May
18, 2005, available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/
serialset/creports/pdf/109-62/hr109-62.pdf.
4.  Disproportionate Share Hospital payments are
intended to accommodate costs of hospitals with
a higher than average share of uninsured low-
income patients with high health costs. Eligible
hospitals receive higher reimbursement relative to
those without a DSH designation. Federal DSH
payments grew rapidly between 1990 and 1992
and remained at high levels thereafter. 
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5.  See John D. Klemm, “Medicaid Spending: A
Brief History,” Health Care Financing Review, Fall
2000, Table 1, pp. 105–12.
6.  As Figure 2 shows, there is a slight reduction of
Medicaid outlays as a share of GDP (or federal total
outlays) a few years after the ends of both reces-
sions, that is, once economic recovery is in full
swing. However, the reductions in outlay shares
during boom years has never reduced Medicaid’s
outlay share to prerecession levels. There is no evi-
dence to suggest that the reductions in Medicaid
expenditures as a share of GDP that we are cur-
rently witnessing would break from that historical
pattern. 
7.  Data on Medicaid enrollment and spending
reported in each CPS survey refer to the respon-
dent family’s status during the previous year.
8.  See “A 125-Year Picture of the Federal Govern-
ment’s Share of the Economy,” Congressional
Budget Office, Long-Range Policy Brief, July 1,
2002. Obviously, damping the growth of benefits
per enrollee at a slightly faster rate and damping the
growth of the share of enrollees at a slightly slower
rate (or vice versa) would be consistent with eventu-
ally achieving growth in aggregate benefits equal to
growth in GDP and achieving the CBO benchmark
of Medicaid’s share of GDP in 2075 (5.3 percent).
The impact of altering the relative rates of damping
the two growth rates results in a slightly different
generational distribution of benefits relative to gen-
eral revenues by cohort. However, the main conclu-
sion—that Medicaid benefits would eventually take
up an overwhelming portion of each cohort’s gen-
eral revenue payments—is not altered for the alter-
native examined later in the text.
9.  Richard Kronick of the University of California,
San Diego, and David Rousseau, principal analyst
with the Kaiser Medicaid Commission, recently
estimated Medicaid’s costs for the period 2005–
2045. Unfortunately, Medicaid’s cost growth is
unlikely to abate by the middle of this century
because the youngest baby boomers will still be
alive and in their eighties. Moreover, human
longevity is expected to increase continually
through the 21st century, implying a growing pop-
ulation of the oldest old who tend to be highly
dependent on Medicaid’s nursing home and other
health benefits. Hence, rapid Medicaid enrollment
growth and growth in outlays per beneficiary are
both likely to continue well beyond 2045.
10. Assuming that Medicaid outlay growth is like-
wise reduced at the state level and federal match-
ing grants average 57 cents per dollar of state out-
lays through the year 2106, the present value of
total (federal and state) Medicaid outlays as a
share of GDP where both are calculated through
the next 100 years would be 6.7 percent of the pre-
sent value of GDP through 2106. 
11. Converted to calendar year basis using data
from Table 9 in CBO’s historical budget tables avail-
able at http://www.cbo.gov/budget/historical.xls. 
12. Converted to calendar year on the basis of data
available from the Congressional Budget Office at
http://www.cbo.gov/Spreadsheet/7731_Tables.
xls. 
13. The 2006 ratio of general revenues to GDP
equals 12 percent. That ratio is projected to
increase to about 14 percent by 2106. 
14. Note that under the base case, enrollment
rates for future populations would be no higher
than 25 percent of the overall population. The
reason for a rising share of lifetime Medicaid ben-
efits in lifetime general revenues is population
aging. Increasing longevity means a larger seg-
ment of the lifetime would be spent in retirement
and a smaller share in working age groups. The
impact of rising longevity is magnified by growth
in benefits at annual rates faster than GDP per
capita. For example, damping the growth of bene-
fits at only 0.8 percent per year implies that the
growth rate in year 100 is reduced to just 45 per-
cent of its current value. 
15. More recently, Medicaid has experienced slower
outlay growth, but much of it can be attributed to
shifting a rapidly growing component, Medicaid’s
drug outlays, to Medicare Part D. That reclassifica-
tion by itself does not affect the conclusions from
this analysis about the extent of financial pressure
exerted on the federal budget by Medicaid’s provi-
sion of health care to a growing segment of the
population. Whether prescription drug coverage
for this population segment were nominally cov-
ered under Medicare or Medicaid would not alter
the fact that those costs would continue to exert
pressure on the federal budget. 
16. Data on Medicaid enrollment and spending
reported in each CPS survey refer to the respon-
dent family’s status during the previous year.
17. Income tax, customs’ duties, profiles by age and
gender are obtained from the Current Population
Survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics; corporate
and capital income tax profiles from the Survey of
Consumer Finances of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve system; property, excise, and
other indirect tax profiles are derived from the
Survey of Consumer Expenditures of the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. 
18. See Congressional Budget Office, Budget and
Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2008–17, January 2007.
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19. At the time of writing, the March 2006 release
of the Current Population Survey did not contain
information on Medicaid benefits. 
20. The CBO’s estimate of Medicaid enrollment for
2006 equals 60.9 million. See “Detailed Projections
for Medicare, Medicaid, and State Children’s
Health Insurance Program,” Congressional Budget
Office, March 2007. The SSA’s estimate of the 2006
population equals 299.3 million (midyear esti-
mate). The midyear estimate is appropriate because
part-year enrollments occurring throughout the
year are included in the CBO’s estimate of total
enrollees. Moreover, dividing by end-year popula-
tion estimates would bias the population share of
enrollees downward. But that would mean growth
in Medicaid enrollments would have to be damped
at a slower rate (allowing for faster future enroll-
ment growth) to reach the target population share
of enrollees of 25 percent. Hence, dividing by the
midyear population provides conservative esti-
mates of the present value of future Medicaid
spending. 
21. This implied rate of underreporting is some-
what higher than those found in the literature.
For example, Jacob Alex Klerman, Jeanne S.
Ringel, and Beth Roth indicate underreporting
rates of about 30 percent for adults and 25 per-
cent for children in the California Medicaid pro-
gram. Nevertheless, assuming a higher rate of
enrollment is reasonable because the underre-
porting problem has become more severe during
the later years of the Current Population Survey.
See Jacob Alex Klerman, Jeanne S. Ringel, and
Beth Roth, “Underreporting of Medicaid and
Welfare in the Current Population Survey,”
RAND Labor and Population Working Paper no.
WR-169-3, March 2005. A larger correction for
underreporting implies a higher population share
of enrollees in the base year (2006). But that
means the assumed growth in future enrollees
must be smaller to attain any given target ratio
(assumed here to be 25 percent of the popula-
tion). In turn, that implies that the present value
of future Medicaid spending would be lower—
that is, more conservative. 
22. See CBO, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal
Years 2007–2016, January 2006, Appendix F. Medi-
caid outlays equal $180.6 billion for fiscal year
2006. CBO’s projections place federal Medicaid
outlays for the 2007 fiscal year at $192. 7 billion.
Conversion to a calendar year basis yields the value
of $189.5 billion for 2005. The CBO estimates are
available at http://www.cbo.gov/budget/factsheets
/2007b/medicaid.pdf. 
23. Details regarding SSA’s population projections
and extensions beyond 2080 are available in
Jagadeesh Gokhale and Kent Smetters, Fiscal and
Generational Imbalances: New Budget Measures for New
Budget Priorities (Washington: AEI Press, 2003). An
updated version of those projections from the SSA
was used in this study.
24. Although this paper’s main objective is to
measure the pressure that Medicaid outlays
would impose on the federal budget, one could
also use this methodology to project the pro-
gram’s total (federal and state) cost. Doing so
would require an assumption about future feder-
al match rates. For example, if the federal govern-
ment sustains an average match rate of 57 cents
per dollar of total Medicaid spending, total pro-
jected Medicaid spending would equal federal
spending divided by 0.57.  
25. See, for example, Michael F. Cannon, “Medi-
caid’s Unseen Costs,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis
no. 548, August 18, 2005, http://www.cato.org/
pub_display.php?pub_id=4049. 
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